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I. INTRODUCTION 
For nearly a century, the Insular Cases have provided the rickety, 
constitutionally dubious foundation upon which the law of United States 
Territories was built. The doctrine of territorial incorporation,1 which serves as 
its foundation, is approaching the centenary of its unanimous endorsement by 
the Supreme Court.2 The doctrine essentially states that the territories are not “a 
part” of the United States, but are “merely belonging to it.”3 The Insular Cases 
and their progeny divided the states from the territories,4 making them 
“foreign . . . in a domestic sense.”5 Congress, by statute, extended citizenship to 
the inhabitants of all U.S. territories except the American Samoans, who are 
U.S. nationals.6 This national status endures partly from congressional inaction 
and partly because American Samoans themselves are split on the issue. 
American Samoan political leaders have generally opposed citizenship,7 fearing 
 
 1 Essentially, the Constitution applies fully only in “incorporated” territories that are 
“surely destined for statehood” and are explicitly incorporated by an act of Congress or 
treaty, while the Constitution applies partially in “unincorporated” territories. See 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757–64 (2008); see also Definitions of Insular Area 
Political Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INSULAR AFFAIRS, 
https://www.doi.gov/oia/islands/politicatypes [https://perma.cc/R3SQ-PNTK] (explaining 
terms related to the U.S. Territories, including incorporated and unincorporated territories). 
All the current, populated U.S. Territories (American Samoa, Guam, The Northern Mariana 
Islands, Puerto Rico, and The U.S. Virgin Islands) are unincorporated. 
 2 See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 300, 305 (1922). 
 3 Id. at 305. 
 4 The Insular Cases are themselves numerous and not precisely defined; different 
authorities propose different cases. Compare Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 756–57 (referring to 
six cases as the Insular Cases), with Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American 
Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 798 n.2 (2005) (analyzing 
“eight of the Insular Cases”). See also infra Part III (discussing the relevance of the cases at 
present). 
 5 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341 (1901) (White, J., concurring). 
 6 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (2012) (Puerto Rico); 8 U.S.C. § 1406 (2012) (United States Virgin 
Islands); 8 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012) (Guam); 48 U.S.C. § 1801(301) (2012) (Commonwealth of 
the Northern Mariana Islands); 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (2012) (covering American Samoa). 
 7 See Fili Sagapolutele, Federal Judge Grants ASG and Amata “Permissive 
Intervention”, SAMOA NEWS (Sept. 14, 2018), http://www.samoanews.com/local-
news/federal-judge-grants-asg-and-amata-permissive-intervention [https://perma.cc/352Z 
-8AXT] (discussing American Samoa Congresswoman Aumua Amata and the American 
Samoan Government’s intervention against the plaintiff in Fitisemanu); Brief in Opposition 
by Respondents American Samoa Government and the Office of Congresswoman Aumua 
Amata of American Samoa at 1, Tuaua v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2461 (2016) (No. 15-
981). But see 1982 Omnibus Territories: Hearing on S. 2088, S. 2089, S. 2090, S. 2632, 
S. 2633, S. 2729, and S. 2888 Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th 
Cong. 241–42 (1982) (statement of Congressman Fofō I.F. Sunia, Delegate of American 
Samoa) (Representative Sunia stating his support for U.S. citizenship despite his 
constituents’ concerns). 
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collateral harm to their culture.8 American Samoans may travel freely to the 
United States, but on the mainland, they face difficulties citizens would not, 
which has recently sparked litigation.9  
Fitisemanu v. United States, the most recent action involving the 
national/citizen distinction, is currently underway in the Federal District Court 
for the District of Utah.10 John Fitisemanu and his co-plaintiffs currently live in 
Utah but were born in American Samoa, and as a result, they are U.S. nationals 
and did not become U.S. citizens at birth.11 The plaintiffs assert their national 
status unfairly causes them “unique obstacles” in obtaining work, accessing 
government benefits, and sponsoring the immigration of family members, and 
demeans them as second-class Americans.12 The plaintiffs seek a decision 
extending the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of citizenship to American 
Samoans.13 
The plaintiffs in Fitisemanu seek a different result from the recent decision 
in Tuaua v. United States, where the D.C. Circuit rejected a substantially similar 
effort to extend constitutional citizenship as inconsistent with territorial 
 
 8 See FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS STUDY COMM. OF AM. SAM., FINAL REPORT 64–66 
(Jan. 2007) [on file with Ohio State Law Journal] (recommending “American Samoa not 
seek US citizenship for its people at [that] time”); Rose Cuison Villazor, Problematizing the 
Protection of Culture and the Insular Cases, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 127, 128 (2018); Stanley 
K. Laughlin, Cultural Preservation in Pacific Islands: Still a Good Idea—and 
Constitutional, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 331, 331 (2005) [hereinafter Laughlin, Cultural 
Preservation]; Michael W. Weaver, The Territory Federal Jurisdiction Forgot: The 
Question of Greater Federal Jurisdiction in American Samoa, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 
325, 341 (describing those cultural practices); see also WILLIAM O. JENKINS, U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AMERICAN SAMOA: ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH SOME FEDERAL 
COURT OPTIONS 24–25 (2008) (noting the American Samoan people greatly value their 
traditional matai governmental and communal land tenure systems). 
 9 See Tuaua, 136 S. Ct. at 2461 (denying certiorari); Complaint, Fitisemanu v. United 
States, 1:18-cv-00036, 2018 WL 6068535 (D. Utah Mar. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Fitisemanu 
Complaint]. 
 10 Fitisemanu v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-00036, 2018 WL 6068535 (D. Utah Sept. 
10, 2018). Regardless of its outcome, this case will likely be appealed to the Tenth Circuit. 
 11 See Fitisemanu Complaint, supra note 9, at 2. 
 12 See id. at 3–6 (describing a statement printed on American Samoans’ passports 
stating: “THE BEARER IS A UNITED STATES NATIONAL AND NOT A UNITED 
STATES CITIZEN,” as a “badge of inferiority” they are forced to wear and this “inferior 
status” “diminishes their standing in their communities and in our Nation as a whole” and 
“inflicts irreparable and continuing harm”). Plaintiff John Fitisemanu’s career opportunities 
have been limited, because many government civil service positions require citizenship. Id. 
at 5. Plaintiff Pale Tuli, for example, cannot become a police officer because he is not a 
citizen. Id. at 5–6. No plaintiff is eligible to vote. Id. at 5. 
 13 Id. at 33–34 (including the finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1) is unconstitutional, that 
U.S. State Department policies identifying American Samoans as non-citizen nationals are 
unconstitutional, an injunction against enforcing such policies, and an order to use new 
passports recognizing plaintiffs’ citizen status). 
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incorporation and the Insular Cases.14 The Fitisemanu plaintiffs ultimately seek 
a circuit split.15 Fitisemanu makes three claims for relief,16 advanced under three 
theories.17 Taken together, the Fitisemanu plaintiffs assert the Supreme Court 
should extend Fourteenth Amendment birthright citizenship to American Samoa 
without abrogating the Insular Cases and their doctrine of territorial 
incorporation.18 However, the plaintiffs and their amici still question territorial 
incorporation’s validity.19 Their argument is likely structured in this way to 
convince the court to distinguish its ruling from Tuaua,20 but it could lead higher 
courts to question the constitutional standing of the entire doctrine of territorial 
incorporation. 
Arguing against the Insular Cases is no small matter. Currently, they give 
Congress vast constitutional latitude to govern the unincorporated territories and 
provide a “peculiar kind” of “constitutional theory of secession.”21 If the Insular 
 
 14 Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 306 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
2461 (2016). 
 15 Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff at 26, 
Fitisemanu, 2018 WL 6068535 (D. Utah Mar. 30, 2018) [hereinafter Fitisemanu Summary 
Judgment Motion]. 
 16 First, that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of citizenship at birth applies to 
America Samoa. Fitisemanu Complaint, supra note 9, at 8–12. Second, that American Samoa 
should be considered “Subject To The Jurisdiction” of and “In” the United States. Id. at 12–
18. Third, their current status deprives them of equal dignity and stigmatizes them as second-
class Americans. Id. at 18–29. 
 17 First, that the Insular Cases are irrelevant to determining the geographic scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Citizenship Clause, which functionally requires overruling them. 
Fitisemanu Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 15, at 30–32. Second, even if the Insular 
Cases control, the Citizenship Clause still applies within their framework. Id. at 33–37. The 
plaintiffs also contend the State Department’s policies violate the Administrative Procedures 
Act, but this claim is not analyzed in this Note. Id. at 38–39. 
 18 Id. at 30–33. 
 19 Id. at 28–32 (suggesting the Insular Cases may not remain good law and highlighting 
the racial animus incorporated into the decisions); Memorandum for Amici Curiae Scholars 
of Constitutional Law and Legal History in Support of Neither Party at 15–22, Fitisemanu, 
2018 WL 6068535 (D. Utah Apr. 24, 2018) [hereinafter Constitutional Law Amici Curiae 
Memorandum] (describing “[t]he notion that some territories are ‘incorporated’ while others 
are not” as “constitutionally infirm” and also discussing the history of racial animus 
associated with the decisions). 
 20 This may have struck a chord with the court. During oral arguments, the judge 
challenged the United States with questions and statements such as: “I don’t have to overrule 
[the Insular Cases], they don’t apply to this case. That’s all I have to find.” Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 32, Fitisemanu, 2018 WL 6068535 (D. Utah Nov. 21, 2018). 
 21 See Burnett, supra note 4, at 802–03, 877 (“If the Insular Cases must be understood 
as authorizing the deannexation of U.S. territory, then it is polemical, but by no means 
preposterous, to see these cases as setting forth nothing less than a constitutional theory of 
secession (albeit of a peculiar kind). Giving tooth to this claim would demand engagement 
with recent historical scholarship working to situate the United States’ imperial experiment 
with respect to the racial, social, political, and constitutional crises of the Civil War and its 
aftermath. . . . Although I have stopped short of developing a full-fledged ‘secessionist’ 
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Cases were abrogated, the territories would be instantly incorporated and 
permanently bound to the United States, which would remove independence as 
an option for any territory’s final status.22 Should the court adopt the Fitisemanu 
plaintiffs’ contention that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
applies sui generis in the territories, but leaves territorial incorporation 
unaltered, it would breathe life into a constitutional guarantee of citizenship that 
would still place major constraints on any plan for a territory’s independence.23 
This Note considers the potential results of such a ruling. The precise nature 
of the final decision is profoundly important, as the full abrogation of territorial 
incorporation constitutionally closes the door on independence as a possible 
final status for any territory. However, a ruling extending birthright citizenship 
to the territories under a jus soli24 argument that leaves the Insular Cases 
undisturbed would limit the territories’ options, but still permit a qualified form 
of independence.25 The inability to provide adequate representation for the 
territories is one of, if not the longest lasting, constitutional failures in the 
American system of government.26 For more than a century, the United States 
has endured this rot within the Constitution’s framework. The United States 
must ensure full self-government for each territory on its own terms.27 
Rectifying this unequal status benefits citizens and nationals both in the 
territories and the states, as the health of the American system of government is 
undermined when millions of people under the American flag persist in an 
unconstitutional quasi-colonial status. 
Part II of this Note provides a brief background on the legal history of the 
U.S. territories. Part III examines the Insular Cases, particularly Balzac v. Porto 
 
interpretation of the Insular Cases in this Article, such an understanding could be defended 
in part on the basis of the deannexationist account I have offered here . . . .”). 
 22 See infra Part V.A. 
 23 See Burnett, supra note 4, at 877. 
 24 Jus soli is a British common law doctrine finding reciprocal bonds of allegiance 
between the subject and sovereign, articulated most prominently by Sir Edward Coke in 
Calvin’s Case. See Lisa Maria Perez, Note, Citizenship Denied: The Insular Cases and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1029, 1046–48 (2008) (discussing the case and 
doctrine); infra Part IV.A. 
 25 See infra Part V.A. 
 26 See, e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Land that Democratic Theory Forgot, 83 IND. 
L.J. 1525, 1528 (2008) (discussing the problems with democracy and government that 
unincorporated territories face); Rafael Hernández Colón, The Evolution of Democratic 
Governance under the Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 50 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
587, 591 (2017). Additionally, one could argue that the problem has existed for the United 
States’ entire history, given the status of Washington, D.C. and its citizens. While I recognize 
similarities between D.C.’s status and the territories, including the specter of racial animus 
in their histories, the fact that D.C. has no claim to international self-determination makes it 
a distinct, although still relevant, problem requiring a different resolution. 
 27 See Carlos Iván Gorrín Peralta, Past, Present, and Future of U.S. Territories: 
Expansion, Colonialism, and Self-Determination, 46 STETSON L. REV. 233, 234 (2017) 
(discussing normative problems with the current U.S. territorial legal regime). 
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Rico,28 in conjunction with Texas v. White, arguing Balzac permits the United 
States to cede or deannex an unincorporated territory, which is otherwise 
impossible for incorporated territories under Texas v. White. Part IV explores 
the difference between constitutional protections for citizenship in U.S. 
territories and the mainland under current law and how the application of 
Fourteenth Amendment birthright citizenship to the territories could 
permanently bind them to the Union. Part V considers possible resolutions to 
Fitisemanu, arguing that the doctrine of territorial incorporation, while seriously 
flawed, should be retained and control this case. The courts should not extend 
Fourteenth Amendment birthright citizenship to American Samoa or any 
territory. Although the status quo is unacceptable, it preserves the most options 
for Congress and the people of the territories to decide their futures. Part VI 
proposes, should the Fitisemanu plaintiffs prevail, that especially intimate 
compacts of free association can serve as a backstop to preserve much of the 
current system’s benefits and permit significant opportunities for self-
government. Part VII briefly concludes. 
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE U.S. TERRITORIES 
The United States has held territories since the nation’s founding, but 
originally they were always considered destined for statehood—until the Insular 
Cases and the American quest for empire in the late 19th century.29 After 
defeating Spain in the Spanish-American War, the United States acquired its 
first unincorporated territories: the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam, from 
Spain.30 The United States annexed American Samoa pursuant to the 1899 
Tripartite Convention with Great Britain and Germany.31 In 1916, Congress set 
 
 28 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). Porto Rico was a common spelling used 
at the time, while Puerto Rico is used at present. This small inconsistency is retained 
throughout this Note in favor of consistency with the original text. 
 29 See Burnett, supra note 4, at 798–801. It seems reasonable that Justice White in 
Downes would contend there were only incorporated territories during American history 
until overseas insular expansion. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 321 (1901) (White, 
J., concurring). Interestingly, this uncertainty about the status of the doctrine of territorial 
incorporation before the Insular Cases was raised in the Fitisemanu oral arguments. See 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 20, at 15–20. 
 30 Treaty of Paris, Spain-U.S., Dec. 10, 1898, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 62 (1898) (Spain 
ceded Guam and Puerto Rico to the United States, but the Philippines were technically 
purchased for twenty million dollars). 
 31 Tripartite Convention, Settlement of Claims in Samoa, Ger.-U.K.-U.S., Dec. 2, 1899, 
AM. SAM. B. ASS’N, https://www.asbar.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=art
icle&id=1949:convention-of-1899&catid=112&Itemid=183 [https://perma.cc/L6U4-
3EZ4] (ceding the current territory of American Samoa to the United States, and what is 
today the Independent State of Samoa to Germany, with Britain renouncing its claims). This 
acquisition was preceded by a series of brutal Samoan civil wars. See William R. Tansill, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AMERICAN SAMOA: A DESCRIPTIVE HISTORICAL PROFILE 28–29 
(1974). Substantially weakened, the Samoans petitioned the United States and Britain for 
annexation on multiple occasions, hoping to guarantee social and political stability while 
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the Philippines on the path to independence, and the United States purchased 
the Virgin Islands from Denmark.32 Congress passed the Jones Act of 1917,33 
giving citizenship to the Puerto Ricans.34 Following the Second World War, the 
United States granted independence to the Philippines,35 and in 1947 received 
the Trust Territory of the Pacific from the United Nations (U.N.).36 Since 1946, 
the U.N. has considered all the unincorporated territories, except Puerto Rico,37 
 
preventing German domination. Id. at 37–38. In 1901 and 1904, the Samoans issued deeds 
of cession to the United States, which outlined why the Samoans desired U.S. control. 
Cession of Tutuila and Aunu’u, Samoa-U.S., Apr. 17, 1900, AM. SAM. B. ASS’N, 
https://www.asbar.org/images/unpublished_cases/cession1.pdf  [https://perma.cc/J8D
E-8WKF]; Cession of Manu’a Islands, Samoa-U.S., July 14, 1904, AM. SAM. B. ASS’N, 
https://www.asbar.org/images/unpublished_cases/cession2.pdf  [https://perma.cc/K7 
H7-DFX9]. The deeds were eventually confirmed and accepted by the Senate in 1929. 48 
U.S.C. § 1661(c) (2012). One could argue these deeds, in fact, are actually the mechanism 
through which the territory was annexed. 
 32 See the Philippine Autonomy (Jones) Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-240, 39 Stat. 545 
(1916) (“Whereas it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States 
to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands . . . .”); Treaty of the Danish West 
Indies, Den.-U.S., Aug. 4, 1916, https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/oia/ 
about/upload/vitreaty.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH29-482U] (purchasing the present-day 
United States Virgin Islands). 
 33 Jones (Jones-Shafroth) Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-368, 39 Stat. 951 (1917). 
 34 See José Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire: Notes on the Legislative 
History of the United States Citizenship of Puerto Ricans, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391, 396–98, 
403 (noting the extension of citizenship occurred by a Congress “[i]ndifferent or hostile” to 
eventual statehood and “unaware of any clear-cut or vigorous” independence movement 
meant to signal a permanence in the U.S.-Puerto Rican relationship, unlike that with the 
Philippines). In addition to this permanence, interestingly, the idea of eventual statehood for 
Puerto Rico was publicly contemplated. 51 CONG. REC. 16,034 (1914) (statement of Rep. 
Borland) (“I anticipate final statehood for Porto Rico. I have no hesitation about saying 
that.”).  
 35 Philippines Independence (Tydings-McDuffie) Act, Pub. L. No. 73-127, 48 Stat. 456 
(1934). 
 36 The Trust Territory includes the present-day Republic of the Marshall Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of Palau, and the U.S. Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands—Japan’s former Pacific colonies, taken after the Second World 
War. The U.N. Trusteeship system had its origin in the League of Nations Mandate System, 
the idea being that the territories were held in trust for their inhabitants who would one day 
be permitted to choose full independence or continue to be ruled by their Trustee. Larry 
Wentworth, The International Status and Personality of Micronesian Political Entities, 16 
ILSA J. INT’L L. 1, 1–9 (1993). Ultimately the Northern Mariana Islands chose to remain 
under American control. Id. at 12–13. The Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau chose 
independence, but to establish treaties of free association with the United States. See id. at 
13–16. 
 37 G.A. Res. 748 (VIII), at 25–26 (Nov. 27, 1953) (removing Puerto Rico from the list 
of non-self-governing territories); see also Developments in the Law, The International 
Place of Puerto Rico, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1656, 1657–65 (2017) (criticizing the United 
States’ treatment of Puerto Rico and the U.N.’s decision to remove it from the list of non-
self-governing territories). 
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as “Non-Self-Governing” Territories.38 This designation prompted the creation 
of a special compact for Puerto Rico in 1953,39 which led to its removal from 
that list.40 However, Puerto Rico’s status remains subject to scrutiny from the 
U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization and criticism by countries opposed 
to the United States.41  
Almost every territory has a constitutional system of government authorized 
by Congress, which resemble the systems of government employed in the fifty 
states.42 Uniquely, American Samoa is still governed under the original 1929 
congressional delegation of power to the Executive, so the Secretary of the 
Interior exercises substantial authority.43 The international embarrassment the 
United States suffers from its failure to fully enfranchise its territorial population 
pales in comparison to the United States’ normative failure to fulfill its own 
fundamental promises of popular self-government and political equality.44  
 
 38 See Non-Self-Governing Territories, UNITED NATIONS (2017), https://www.un.org/ 
dppa/decolonization/en/nsgt [https://perma.cc/CS8E-HVJ2]; U.N. Charter art. 73 
(discussing guarantees made to the people of non-self-governing territories). 
 39 Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act of (July 3) 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319 
(1950) (granting substantial autonomy to Puerto Rico). Despite the potential importance of 
that statute, Puerto Rico’s constitutional status remains essentially the same. See Peralta, 
supra note 27, at 243–53 (discussing how that statute, also known as the Compact was a 
“constitutional mirage,” the gradual deterioration of the idea that Puerto Rico had a status 
different from any other territory, and how “PROMESA seems to be the culmination of 
colonial government”). 
 40 G.A. Res. 748 (VIII), at 25–26 (Nov. 27, 1953). 
 41 See supra text accompanying note 37; Rep. of the Special Comm. on the Situation 
with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/AC.109/2017/L.13 (Feb. 12, 2018) 
(noting criticism from countries including Bolivia, China, Cuba, Russia, Syria, and 
Venezuela).  
 42 48 U.S.C. §§ 1421–28 (2012) (pertaining to Guam); §§ 1801–08 (pertaining to the 
Northern Mariana Islands); §§ 731–916 (pertaining to Puerto Rico); §§ 1541–1645 
(pertaining to the U.S. Virgin Islands). That is to say the territories have a tripartite separation 
of powers between an executive, bicameral legislature, and judiciary, and their constitutions 
guarantee similar rights. 
 43 48 U.S.C. § 1661(c) (2012) (vesting “all civil, judicial, and military powers” in the 
President “[u]ntil Congress shall provide for the government of such islands”); Exec. Order 
No. 10264, 16 Fed. Reg. 6417 (June 29, 1951) (delegating the President’s authority to the 
Secretary of the Interior). The Secretary of the Interior can even overturn the decisions of 
the High Court of American Samoa. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints v. Hodel, 830 F.2d 374, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 44 See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 5 (U.S. 1776) (“[R]efus[ing] to 
pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people 
would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature.”); ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 
Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 
1859−1865, at 536 (Don. E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1988) (promoting “government of the people, 
by the people”). Further, the territories’ seemingly perpetual, inferior legal standing vis-à-
vis the states also warps fundamental principles of federalism, diluting the Equality of States. 
See Doctrine of the Equality of States, JUSTIA, https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/article-
4/15-doctrine-of-the-equality-of-states.html [https://perma.cc/KU6R-JM2K]. 
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III. THE INSULAR CASES PERMIT THE UNITED STATES TO CEDE LAND 
Traditionally, the Insular Cases provide that the Constitution applies fully 
in states and incorporated territories that enjoy an implicit promise of statehood, 
while only fundamental provisions apply in unincorporated territories.45 Today, 
no scholar defends the Insular Cases as correctly decided; any defense is 
qualified by practical concerns about overturning a century-old system and 
precedent.46 This Note takes a similar position. This Part examines the Insular 
Cases’ current meaning and explores the possibility that they offer a 
“constitutional theory of secession,”47 concluding they permit Congress to grant 
independence to unincorporated territories, which would otherwise be 
unconstitutional.  
A. The Insular Cases Remain Valid While Shifting to Protect Local 
Customs 
The framework created by the Insular Cases and their progeny give 
Congress plenary power to govern the territories with limited constitutional 
restraints.48 Fortunately, Congress has granted many constitutional rights by 
statute, and the courts have found that some apply automatically.49 Although the 
 
 45 See Burnett, supra note 4, at 800. 
 46 See Constitutional Law Amici Curiae Memorandum, supra note 19, at 18 (observing 
“no current scholar” has defended the Insular Cases from any “methodological perspective” 
(quoting Gary Lawson & Robert D. Sloane, The Constitutionality of Decolonization by 
Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico’s Legal Status Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1146 
(2008))); Russell Rennie, Note, A Qualified Defense of the Insular Cases, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1683, 1685 (2017) (“The foregoing critiques are persuasive, and this Note does not attempt 
to rationalize or defend the offensive origins and effects of the Insular doctrine. It does seek, 
however, to complicate the legacy of the cases.”).  
 47 See Burnett, supra note 4, at 802–03. 
 48 See infra Part III.A.2. But see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757 (2008) (“The 
Constitution has independent force in these territories, a force not contingent upon acts of 
legislative grace. Yet it took note of the difficulties inherent in that position . . . reluctant to 
risk the uncertainty and instability that could result from a rule that displaced altogether the 
existing legal systems in these newly acquired Territories . . . resulted in the doctrine of 
territorial incorporation, under which the Constitution applies in full in incorporated 
Territories surely destined for statehood but only in part in unincorporated Territories.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 49 See Fitisemanu Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 15, at 33–37; see, e.g., Puerto 
Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1876–77 (2016) (extending the Double Jeopardy 
Clause); Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771 (extending the Suspension Clause); Posadas de Puerto 
Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 331 n.1 (1986) (extending the 
First Amendment); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 468–71 (1979) (extending the 
Fourth Amendment); Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 
426 U.S. 572, 600 (1976) (extending the Equal Protection Clause); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson 
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668–69 n.5 (1974) (extending the Due Process Clause); 
Redondo Constr. Corp. v. Izquierdo, 662 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2011) (extending the Contracts 
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Insular Cases’ central holding has stood for nearly a century,50 it is presently 
experiencing renewed attack and renovation. Some call for the Insular Cases’ 
abrogation because their reasoning involves unconstitutional racial animus.51 
However, a developing trend adopted by some courts instead reinterprets the 
cases to protect indigenous cultures and customs.52 The Supreme Court has yet 
to opine directly, but these recent lower court precedents, combined with 
Boumediene, suggest increasing support for the protective reinterpretation of the 
Insular Cases. 
 
Clause); Tenoco Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 876 F.2d 1013, 1017 n.9 (1st Cir. 
1989) (extending the Takings Clause). But see Rabang v. I.N.S., 35 F.3d 1449, 1465 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (“The only constitutionally protected individual rights 
that the Supreme Court has found inapplicable to unincorporated territories are the rights to 
trial by jury and to a grand jury indictment.”). 
 50 See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287–345 (1901) (White, J., concurring) 
(positing the doctrine of territorial incorporation); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304–
05 (1922) (unanimously affirming the doctrine of territorial incorporation). 
 51 See, e.g., Downes, 182 U.S. at 287 (“If those possessions are inhabited by alien races, 
differing from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation and modes of thought, the 
administration of government and justice, according to Anglo-Saxon principles, may for a 
time be impossible; and the question at once arises whether large concessions ought not to 
be made for a time, that, ultimately, our own theories may be carried out, and the blessings 
of a free government under the Constitution extended to them.”); Developments in the Law, 
American Samoa and the Citizenship Clause: A Study in Insular Cases Revisionism, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1700–01 (2017) (finding the Insular Cases “serve to perpetuate and 
unequal and untenable status quo” creating a “regime of . . . political apartheid” derived from 
“intrinsically racist imperialism of a previous era of United States colonial expansionism” 
(internal quotations omitted)); Perez, supra note 24, at 1029 (“[T]he doctrine of territorial 
incorporation reasserts Dred Scott’s race-based approach to citizenship and should be 
overruled.” (italicization altered)). 
 52 See Laughlin, Cultural Preservation, supra note 8, at 344 (recognizing the “colonial 
mentality” that existed when the cases were decided, but seeking to appropriate them, 
making “the incorporation doctrine [] a basis for upholding local laws designed to protect 
indigenous people and their traditional culture”); see also American Samoa and the 
Citizenship Clause, supra note 51, at 1702 (observing “it appears that a significant part of 
the federal judiciary has now concluded, with Laughlin,” that it is in the best interest of the 
judiciary to respect local cultures); Rennie, supra note 46, at 1686–87 (arguing such a 
judicial “accommodationist” policy is “defensible, perhaps even imperative” from a 
democratic perspective). But see Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of 
Formalism, 78 CAL. L. REV. 853, 908 (1990) (arguing formalists could conceive of the 
Constitution’s stance on territories as “constitutionally mandated colonialism, which is not 
likely to go over well at cocktail parties,” that devolved powers of self-government exercised 
by the territories is unconstitutional, which requires major changes in territorial governance 
or a constitutional amendment); Burnett, supra note 4, at 799 (arguing the Insular Cases 
permit the United States to “deannex” unincorporated territories). 
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1. The Insular Cases under Current Law 
The entire doctrine of territorial incorporation derives from several cases,53 
but the two most important for this Note are Downes v. Bidwell54 and Balzac v. 
Porto Rico. Downes considered the constitutionality of import duties on goods 
shipped from Puerto Rico to New York.55 The otherwise-fractured Court held 
that Puerto Rico “is a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, 
but not a part of the United States,”56 finding Puerto Rico separate, but in vague 
terms. Justice White concurred, articulating his theory of territorial 
incorporation based on international law and America’s previous history of 
expansion.57 Two decades later, the Balzac Court unanimously adopted Justice 
White’s theory that newly acquired territories could be part of the United States 
internationally, but domestically separate and outside the scope of the 
Uniformity Clause.58  
Boumediene v. Bush,59 the most recent Supreme Court case to discuss 
territorial incorporation, surveyed the doctrine’s history and development.60 In 
the Insular Cases, the Court described its essential feature, the “doctrine of 
territorial incorporation” as one “under which the Constitution applies in full in 
incorporated Territories surely destined for statehood but only in part in 
unincorporated Territories.”61 While the contours of the doctrine shifted over 
time,62 its core principle that unincorporated territories are constitutionally 
separate from the United States remains.63  
The Boumediene Court found the Downes Court created territorial 
incorporation because it was “reluctant to risk” creating “uncertainty and 
instability” by displacing the existing civil law systems of the then-newly 
acquired territories.64 While it did not address Balzac’s assertion that the 
territories were not a part of the United States, the Court recognized the U.S. 
 
 53 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 756–57. 
 54 Downes, 182 U.S. at 244–345. 
 55 Id. at 247. 
 56 Id. at 287. 
 57 Id. at 287–345 (White, J., concurring). 
 58 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922) (“Porto Rico was [not a] territory 
which had been incorporated in the Union or become a part of the United States, as 
distinguished from merely belonging to it . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8. 
 59 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 60 Id. at 756–66. 
 61 Id. at 757. 
 62 See Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall, Between the Foreign and the 
Domestic: The Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and Reinvented, in FOREIGN 
IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 1–
36 (2001). 
 63 Balzac, 258 U.S. at 307–08 (holding that even the statutory extension of citizenship 
was insufficient to infer incorporation). 
 64 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 757 (citing Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282 (1901)). 
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Constitution operated in them with some “independent force”65 and that even in 
1922 the Court “took for granted” that “certain fundamental personal rights” 
existed in the territories, independent of Congress’s choice to extend them.66 
The Court further observed the importance of “particular circumstances,” 
“practical necessities,” Congress’s potential alternative options, and whether the 
judicial extension of a constitutional provision would be “impractical and 
anomalous.”67 While the Court did not explicitly require consideration of the 
aforementioned concerns, it signaled their relevance.68 The altered application 
of constitutional provisions in territories suggests citizenship rights may be 
different in unincorporated territories. 
2. Recent Lower Court Decisions Favor Reinterpreting Territorial 
Incorporation to Protect Local Culture 
In Tuaua v. United States, the D.C. Circuit determined Fourteenth 
Amendment birthright citizenship did not extend automatically to American 
Samoa because the imposition of citizenship would be impractical and 
anomalous.69 Tuaua provides direct lower court precedent opposing the 
plaintiffs in Fitisemanu, as both cases advance essentially the same claim.70 The 
court found the Citizenship Clause “textually ambiguous” regarding whether “in 
 
 65 Id.  
 66 Id. at 758 (quoting Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312). 
 67 Id. at 759 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
In Reid, a plurality decision differed on the precise language, but the Boumediene Court 
observed the concurrence of Justice Harlan, who “was most explicit in rejecting a ‘rigid and 
abstract rule’ for determining where constitutional guarantees extend” and stressing the 
importance of “the ‘particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible 
alternatives which Congress had before it’ and, in particular, whether judicial enforcement 
of the provision would be ‘impracticable and anomalous.’” Id. at 759 (quoting Reid, 354 
U.S. at 74–75 (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 
U.S. 259, 277–78 (1990) (J. Kennedy, concurring) (citing the previous Harlan concurrence 
approvingly in reference to his impracticable and anomalous test for the applicability of 
constitutional provisions in the territories). 
 68 See supra text accompanying note 67. 
 69 Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 310 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 70 Compare Complaint at 17, 20, 21, Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88 
(D.D.C. 2013) (No. 1:12-cv-01143-RJL) (“The defendants refuse to recognize that persons 
born in American Samoa are U.S. citizens under the Citizenship Clause [of the Fourteenth 
Amendment] . . . . The State Department will not provide the individual plaintiffs with U.S. 
passports recognizing that they are U.S. citizens . . . . Defendant’s refusal to recognize the 
U.S. citizenship of the individual plaintiffs causes material harms.”) (formatting and 
capitalization altered), with Fitisemanu Complaint, supra note 9, at 8, 18 (“The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Citizenship Clause makes all those born in the United States and subject to its 
jurisdiction citizens from birth. . . . The Defendants’ actions deprive American Samoans of 
equal dignity under the law and stigmatize them as second-class Americans.”) (formatting 
and capitalization altered). 
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the United States” applied to territories.71 Under such uncertainty, the court 
considered it “impractical and anomalous” to extend citizenship, especially 
when it would “override the democratic prerogatives of the American Samoan 
people,” whose representatives filed amici briefs opposing judicial extension.72 
Interestingly, the court referenced Boumediene, acknowledging that ties 
between the United States and its unincorporated territories may strengthen in 
constitutionally significant ways,73 hinting that the status quo will not endure 
forever. Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s citizenship guarantees and its application in unincorporated 
territories remain uncertain.74  
Tuaua has important similarities with the Ninth Circuit’s embrace of the 
revisionist approach in Wabol v. Villacrusis.75 The case related to the Northern 
Mariana Islands (NMI), where the plaintiff sued to void a lease made in violation 
of the NMI Constitution’s restrictions against land alienation to non-indigenous 
people.76 The court found the restrictions did not violate the U.S. Constitution’s 
Equal Protection Clause because, in this context, its application would be 
impracticable and anomalous.77 The court noted the importance of the covenant 
that established American sovereignty, which explicitly protected NMI’s land 
alienation laws.78 The court stated that “incorporation analysis thus must be 
 
 71 Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 302 (internal citations omitted). 
 72 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 73 Id. at 309 (“It may well be that over time the ties between the United States and any 
of its unincorporated Territories strengthen in ways that are of constitutional significance.”) 
(quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 758 (2008)). 
 74 See Christina Duffy Ponsa, Are American Samoans American?, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/opinion/are-american-samoans-american.html 
[https://perma.cc/VUS5-AB3W]. 
 75 See Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 76 N. MAR. I. CONST. art. XII (restricting land ownership and long-term interests to 
“persons of Northern Marianas descent” defined as “a citizen or national of the United States 
and who is of at least one-quarter Northern Marianas Chamorro or Northern Marianas 
Carolinian blood or a combination thereof”). A full-blooded person of Northern Marianas 
descent is someone born or domiciled in the territory by 1950 and a citizen before the 
termination of the Pacific Trust Territory. Id. Their constitution also empowers the courts to 
determine Northern Marianas descent if disputed. Id.; Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1452. 
 77 Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1460–61 (citing King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1975)) 
(“‘[T]he particular local setting, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives are 
relevant to a question of judgment, namely, whether jury trial should be deemed a necessary 
condition of the exercise of Congress’s power to provide for the trial of Americans overseas.’ 
The importance of the constitutional right at stake makes it essential that a decision . . . rest 
on a solid understanding of [present conditions in the territory]. That understanding cannot 
be based on unsubstantiated opinion; it must be based on facts . . . . In short, the question is 
whether in [the territory] ‘circumstances are such that trial by jury would be impractical and 
anomalous.’” (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957))). 
 78 Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462; Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the N. Mar. I. 
in Political Union with the United States of America, N. Mar. I-U.S., Feb. 15, 1976, at art. 
V, https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=printdoc&docid=3ae6b54e4 
[https://perma.cc/G899-BJ5H] (explaining that the “applicability of certain provisions of the 
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undertaken with an eye toward preserving Congress’s ability to accommodate 
the unique social and cultural conditions and values of the particular territory.”79 
The Wabol court found the test satisfied because NMI’s scarcity of land gave 
their restrictions a unique stabilizing social effect, promoted the preservation of 
local culture, and because its political union with the United States would not 
have occurred otherwise.80 Further, the court dramatically stated: “The Bill of 
Rights was not intended to interfere with the performance of our international 
obligations. Nor was it intended to operate as a genocide pact for diverse native 
cultures.”81 
In summation, the Insular Cases provide two important determinations for 
this Note. First, Balzac’s legal fiction separating unincorporated territories and 
the incorporated states and territories of the United States rests upon nearly a 
century of precedent. Second, they establish that the doctrine of territorial 
incorporation requires the explicit incorporation of territories by Congress for 
the Constitution to apply fully. That said, the doctrine has recently evolved to 
accommodate local cultures, the extent to which is not yet known.  
B. The Perpetual and Indestructible Union 
The legal fiction separating unincorporated territories from the United 
States and limiting the application of the Constitution makes territorial 
independence possible.82 Texas v. White,83 read in conjunction with Balzac,84 
suggests becoming a part of the United States—incorporation into the Union—
is permanent. Texas v. White discusses the United States as a perpetual union of 
 
[U.S.] Constitution . . . will be without prejudice to the validity of and the power of 
[Congress] to consent to” the section of the Covenant establishing the racial restrictions on 
alienation). 
 79 Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1460 (“In the territorial context, the definition of a basic and 
integral freedom must narrow to incorporate the shared beliefs of diverse cultures. Thus, the 
asserted constitutional guarantee against discrimination in the acquisition of long-term 
interests in land applies only if this guarantee is fundamental in this international sense.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 80 Id. at 1461. Arguably, the same could be said of American Samoa. 
 81 Id. at 1462. 
 82 See Burnett, supra note 4, at 799. 
 83 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1868). Because of the important concurrence of Justice 
White in Downes v. Bidwell, I refer to Texas v. White throughout this Note by its full name 
to avoid any confusion between the two. 
 84 It may appear misplaced to discuss a case related to the American Civil War in 
association with the unincorporated territories, but there are actually important similarities. 
See Burnett, supra note 4, at 802–03 n.15 (“[Amy Kaplan] offers an elegant reading of 
Downes. While she focuses less on the details of the different opinions, and more on the 
broader cultural connotations of the decision . . . she observes (rightly, in [Burnett’s] view) 
that the language of the decision reflected lingering Civil War memories, and keenly notes 
the pervasive preoccupation with dismemberment of the national body.” (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)). 
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states.85 The case focuses on state-federal relations,86 but its powerful language 
about the unity and indissolubility of the polity extends to the population. In 
conjunction with strong constitutional citizenship rights,87 this suggests that, 
absent the Insular Cases’ modification of constitutional requirements, the 
United States cannot sever its connection to incorporated territories if it would 
injure constitutionally protected citizenship. 
Texas v. White resolved a dispute over the validity of bonds issued by the 
Confederate Texan government,88 requiring the Court to determine if Texas 
legally remained a state of the Union during the Civil War.89 The Court found 
unilateral secession unconstitutional so that, even in rebellion, Texas remained 
a state.90 First looking to the Articles of Confederation, the Court observed: 
“[T]he Union was solemnly declared to be perpetual.”91 Continuing, the Court 
found it “difficult to convey the idea of indissoluble unity more clearly”92 than 
with the Constitution’s stated purpose “to form a more perfect Union.”93 
According to Texas v. White: “The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to 
an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible states.”94 Of Texas’s 
annexation and admission into the Union, the Court said “she entered into an 
indissoluble relation”:  
The act which consummated [Texas’s] admission into the Union was 
something more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into 
the political body. And it was final. The union between Texas and the other 
States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union between 
the original States. There was no place for reconsideration, or revocation, 
except through revolution, or through consent of the States.95  
 
 85 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. at 725. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See infra Part IV.B. 
 88 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. at 718. 
 89 Id. at 719. 
 90 Id. at 726 (stating Texas’s secession and all acts of its Confederate government “were 
absolutely null” and that the obligations and bonds of the Union “remained perfect and 
unimpaired”). 
 91 Id. at 725; see also ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, pmbl. (1777). 
 92 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. at 725. 
 93 U.S. CONST., pmbl; Texas v. White, 74 U.S. at 725. 
 94 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. at 725. 
 95 Id. at 726. The use of “consent” as expressed above must refer to a constitutional 
amendment, since it seems absurd that a mere statute could undo an “indissoluble relation” 
with otherwise no “reconsideration or revocation.” See id. Therefore, the reference to consent 
in Texas v. White affirms a rule against leaving the Union without the massive institutional 
support required for a constitutional amendment and a requirement that individual states 
leaving must consent—a rule against expulsion, or in alternate terms, against the 
deannexation of a state. See U.S. CONST. art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be 
deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.”).  
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Unfortunately, because Texas was an independent nation before its 
annexation,96 the case does not directly address whether the perpetual Union 
encompasses territories. Before the Insular Cases, but after Texas v. White, the 
Supreme Court described the territories as “but political subdivisions of the 
outlying dominion of the United States. Their relation to the general government 
is much the same as that which counties bear to the respective states.”97 Before 
the Insular Cases, precedent suggests incorporated territories were a part of the 
indissoluble union.98 
Balzac’s discussion of territorial incorporation appears to build on Texas v. 
White. Before Balzac, when territorial incorporation remained an uncertain 
doctrine, the Court expressed uncertainty whether Congress even possessed the 
power to cede America’s “newly acquired” territories.99 When the Balzac Court 
adopted territorial incorporation unanimously, the refusal to recognize the 
incorporation of Puerto Rico even after Puerto Ricans were given statutory 
citizenship suggests incorporation is an act of profound gravity.100 If Texas v. 
White renders “incorporation . . . final,”101 then the Balzac Court’s repeated 
statements that the Philippines and Puerto Rico had not been “incorporated 
[into] the Union or become a part of the United States,”102 suggest incorporation 
of a territory is permanent incorporation into the Union. From a policy 
perspective, this is consistent with the then-promised independence for the 
Philippines and the then-uncertain final status of Puerto Rico. 
By the Insular Cases’ reasoning, all territories at the time of Texas v. White 
would have been considered incorporated and all citizens in territories at that 
time possessed constitutionally protected citizenship.103 The Texas v. White 
Court articulates, albeit vaguely, a bond of mutual responsibility between the 
 
 96 The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo, 1845−1848, OFF. HISTORIAN: U.S. DEPT. ST. (Aug. 10, 2019), https://history 
.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/texas-annexation [https://perma.cc/J236-VUHR]. 
 97 Nat’l Bank v. Cty. of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1878); see also Avelino J. 
Halagao, Jr., Citizens Denied: A Critical Examination of the Rabang Decision Rejecting 
United States Citizenship Claims by Persons Born in the Philippines During the Territorial 
Period, 5 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 77, 87 (1998) (discussing importance of Yankton). 
 98 See Burnett, supra note 4, at 819–20. However, Burnett, in her analysis of pre-Insular 
Cases territorial jurisprudence, observed that “precedents turn out to be more ambiguous” 
on the applicability of constitutional provisions “than one would expect . . . they reveal that 
the status of constitutional provisions in the territories ha[s] long been a source of confusion, 
and continued to be so up to 1901.” See id. at 819. 
 99 De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 197 (1900) (speculating that “if Congress saw fit to 
cede one of its newly acquired territories (even assuming that it had the right to do so) to a 
foreign power,” the territory would become a foreign country); id. at 199 (“We are unable to 
acquiesce in this assumption that a territory may be at the same time both foreign and 
domestic.”); Burnett, supra note 4, at 860–63. 
 100 See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305–06 (1922). 
 101 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 726 (1868). 
 102 Balzac, 258 U.S. at 305. 
 103 See, e.g., id. 
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federal government and citizens that is of significance.104 The Court discussed 
how rebellion altered the obligations of the federal government, the states, and 
the citizens, observing “[o]bligations often remain unimpaired, while relations 
are greatly changed.”105 The Court observed it was the duty of the federal 
government to restore a constitutionally legitimate government in Texas and to 
ensure the just-freed slaves would be guaranteed participation in the new 
government.106 The Court contemplated a federal responsibility to protect 
individuals’ exercise of citizenship.107 Considering this ruling occurred just 
after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, well before the incorporation 
of most constitutional protections, the now-heightened constitutional guarantee 
directly to individuals should only expand the federal government’s duty to 
citizens. 
The Insular Cases and their subsequent interpretation hold the Constitution 
does not apply the same in the unincorporated territories as it does “in” the 
United States.108 The Constitution operates to the extent it guarantees 
fundamental rights, but likely does not protect a right that would be impractical 
or anomalous in a specific territorial context.109 Recent decisions invoking the 
Insular Cases suggest their reach should not expand and that, over time, changes 
of constitutional significance may occur.110 It seems that the territorial 
incorporation doctrine, resting on a century of precedent—even if steeped in 
folly—may continue to exist, albeit with lessened vigor. The comment about 
constitutional significance suggests a warning for the legislature (and ultimately 
territorial citizens as well) that territories could someday become de facto 
incorporated, in direct contravention of Balzac.111 Perhaps the Supreme Court 
would even use Balzac to overturn itself by finding a century of congressional 
inaction serves as de facto incorporation, as Balzac did speak about the 
territories with an eye to their newly acquired and uncertain future statuses.112 
When read in conjunction with Texas v. White, the Insular Cases suggest 
incorporation is the threshold for entry into the United States. Should the Insular 
Cases be overturned, the territories would become a part of the perpetual and 
indissoluble Union. 
 
 104 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. at 727. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 728–29. 
 107 See id. at 726–28. 
 108 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757–58 (2008). 
 109 See id. at 758. 
 110 See id. (“It may well be that over time the ties between the United States and any of 
its unincorporated Territories strengthen in ways that are of constitutional significance.”); 
Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 309 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S. 
at 758). 
 111 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304–05 (1922). 
 112 See id. at 306. 
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IV. THE PECULIAR STATUS OF TERRITORIAL CITIZENSHIP 
At the heart of Fitisemanu is the question of citizenship.113 The plaintiffs 
argue that regardless of the Insular Cases, the common law doctrine of jus soli 
guarantees Fourteenth Amendment citizenship to the populations of United 
States territories because the right is associated with American sovereignty 
rather than being legally in the United States.114 Fitisemanu only seeks 
extension to American Samoa,115 but if granted, birthright citizenship should 
logically extend to all territories. This Part discusses the jus soli argument and 
explores the difference between constitutional citizenship and statutory 
citizenship, concluding that the greater protections of constitutional citizenship 
could prevent a territory from seeking independence. 
A. The Jus Soli Argument 
The plaintiffs in Fitisemanu and Tuaua and some scholars contend the 
common law doctrine of jus soli extends Fourteenth Amendment citizenship to 
all U.S. territories regardless of their incorporation status.116 The doctrine of jus 
soli is derived from the English common law, which determined those born 
“within the King’s domain” and “within the obedience or ligeance of the King” 
were subjects or, as we would say today, citizens.117 While the Supreme Court 
has previously rejected the argument,118 a broad interpretation of jus soli 
contends the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to codify the traditional 
common law understanding of jus soli, as expressed in United States v. Wong 
 
 113 See discussion supra Part I. 
 114 Fitisemanu Complaint, supra note 9, at 8–9; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 115 Fitisemanu Complaint, supra note 9, at 34. 
 116 Fitisemanu Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 15, at 26–27, 32; Reply Brief of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 11–19, Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 
13-5272); see also Brief of Citizenship Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 2–
14, Fitisemanu v. United States, 1:18-cv-00036, 2018 WL 6068535 (D. Utah Apr. 24, 2018) 
(arguing for a broad interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s jus soli birthright 
citizenship right); Perez, supra note 24, at 1055 (arguing “in the United States” should be 
interpreted according to the traditional common law understanding of jus soli, which would 
include unincorporated territories). 
 117 See Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 304–05 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (discussing and 
rejecting plaintiff’s jus soli argument: “[E]ven assuming the framers intended the Citizenship 
Clause to constitutionally codify jus soli principles, birthright citizenship does not simply 
follow the flag.” (internal citations omitted)); Perez, supra note 24, at 1046–53 (discussing 
Calvin’s Case and the common law history of jus soli in detail). 
 118 Brief for Appellees at 26, Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 
13-5272) (“In fact, Plaintiffs’ and amici’s reliance on an overextension of the principle of 
jus soli and English common law has already been directly rejected by the Supreme Court in 
Rogers where the Court stated: We thus have an acknowledgment that our law in this area 
follows English concepts with an acceptance of the jus soli, that is, that the place of birth 
governs citizenship status except as modified by statute.”) (emphasis and quotation marks 
omitted, formatting altered) (citing Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 828 (1971)). 
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Kim Ark.119 Proponents of this interpretation contend the Insular Cases wrongly 
failed to apply the jus soli doctrine in unincorporated territories.120 Simply, the 
jus soli argument asserts that the citizens of unincorporated territories are 
entitled to constitutional Fourteenth Amendment birthright citizenship because 
of their allegiance to the United States.121 Some contend the territorial 
incorporation doctrine must be repealed to achieve this end,122 however, the 
Fitisemanu plaintiffs argue the doctrine poses no obstacle.123 
B. Constitutional Versus Statutory Citizenship 
The Supreme Court affords tremendous protection to constitutional 
citizenship. In Afroyim v. Rusk, the Court made its fundamental analysis of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause.124 Afroyim challenged the 
Nationality Act of 1940, which automatically revoked the citizenship of any 
 
 119 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898). The Court in Wong Kim 
Ark concluded that:  
The Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by 
birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, 
including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications 
(as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on 
foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our 
territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian 
tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words 
and in manifest intent, includes the children born, within the territory of the United 
States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United 
States. Every citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is within the 
allegiance and the protection, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction, of the United 
States. His allegiance to the United States is direct and immediate, and, although but 
local and temporary, continuing only so long as he remains within our territory, is yet, 
in the words of Lord Coke in Calvin’s Case . . . strong enough to make a natural subject, 
for if he hath issue here, that issue is a natural-born subject. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 120 Perez, supra note 24, at 1055–60. 
 121 Similarly, one could assert it is because the people of the territories are subject to 
U.S. sovereignty. The deeper point is that the Citizenship Clause should apply to states, 
incorporated territories, and unincorporated territories alike. 
 122 Perez, supra note 24, at 1057, 1081 (arguing the Downes Court “took advantage of 
the unique political and geographical circumstances of the insular territories in order to 
retroactively reinterpret the rule of jus soli,” and concluding “it is doubtful that the Court 
will be able to properly correct the scope of the Citizenship Clause without overruling the 
doctrine of incorporation”). 
 123 Fitisemanu Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 15, at 33–37 (“In all events, the 
Insular Cases themselves support the proposition that American Samoans owe allegiance to 
the United States and are thus granted birthright Citizenship by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
codification of the [common law] jus soli rule.”). 
 124 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 254 (1967). 
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American who voluntarily voted in a foreign election.125 The Court found the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects each citizen from the “forcible destruction” of 
their citizenship and recognized a “constitutional right to remain a citizen in a 
free country unless [] voluntarily relinquishe[d].”126 In the past, Congress could 
revoke citizenship in such a way under the “ample scope” of its implied power 
to regulate foreign affairs.127 
Afroyim largely controls the field on citizenship, but not entirely.128 There 
is a serious, although little-discussed, debate over Congress’s ability to revoke 
Puerto Ricans’ citizenship.129 Because the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Citizenship Clause does not extend to Puerto Rico, its people’s citizenship is 
guaranteed only by statute and is revocable.130 Some dismiss the problem,131 
but because the subject is not commonly discussed, a Note by Lisa Maria Perez 
offers the best analysis. Perez contends that while Afroyim suggests Congress 
cannot take citizenship without consent, Rogers v. Bellei limited that holding.132 
The Bellei Court held Afroyim related to citizenship acquired under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, explicitly referencing being “born in” the United 
States,133 and refused to judicially extend those protections to statutory citizens 
for a dual citizen born abroad who inherited his citizenship.134 Bellei raises a 
 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 268. 
 127 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57–60 (1958). 
 128 See Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 307 (2015) (recognizing the importance 
of Afroyim and other cases as supporting that citizenship is a fundamental right in the non-
territorial context). 
 129 Perez, supra note 24, at 1032 (noting the “inferior citizenship status of Puerto 
Ricans . . . reveals a grave inconsistency in the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence”). While much of the discussion focuses on Puerto Rico, there is no reason 
this would not apply similarly in the other territories, as they all possess the same 
constitutional status. See infra note 136. Perhaps the Northern Mariana Islands would be an 
exception due to their unique history. See supra text accompanying note 76. Puerto Rico is 
most discussed, but the legal principles underlying the debate would apply to all territories. 
 130 Perez, supra note 24, at 1029. 
 131 See, e.g., Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, What Does Puerto Rican Citizenship Mean 
for Puerto Rico’s Legal Status?, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 122, 127 (2018); Edwin Melendez, 
Puerto Rican U.S. Citizenship Is Permanent and Irreversible, CTR. FOR PUERTO RICAN STUD. 
(Apr. 16, 2017), https://centropr.hunter.cuny.edu/events-news/puerto-rico-news/Citi 
zenship/puerto-rican-us-citizenship-permanent-and-irreversible [https://perma.cc/A5 
SE-J37F]. 
 132 Perez, supra note 24, at 1032–34, 1069–73 (concluding the doctrine of territorial 
incorporation, as currently understood, permits the revocation of Puerto Rican citizenship). 
But see Blocher & Gulati, supra note 131, at 129–30 (arguing equal protection or some other 
collateral right should prevent wanton revocation). 
 133 Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 835 (1971) (emphasis added). 
 134 Id. (“But, as pointed out above, [Afroyim’s holding on citizenship protections] were 
utterances bottomed upon Fourteenth Amendment citizenship and that Amendment’s direct 
reference to ‘persons born or naturalized in the United States.’ We do not accept the notion 
that those utterances are now to be judicially extended to citizenship not based upon the 
Fourteenth Amendment and to make citizenship an absolute.”); see also Perez, supra note 
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serious question about the durability of people born in the territories’ 
citizenship.135  
The people of Puerto Rico, and the other territories,136 are arguably not 
guaranteed the Fourteenth Amendment citizenship protections of Afroyim and 
can have their American citizenship revoked.137 The extension of constitutional 
citizenship would be necessary to gain Afroyim’s extensive protections. Afroyim 
and the Insular Cases, read together, raise a question as to how Afroyim’s 
protections are modified by the revisionist interpretation of the Insular Cases. 
How the Court would strike that balance is unclear, but it would likely create 
substantial limitations on any territory’s ambition for independence. 
V. THE RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP BINDS THE UNION 
Likely the result of Tuaua, the non-citizen status of American Samoans has 
been a popular topic in recent scholarship.138 Tracking Tuaua, the discussions 
focus on the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee that “[a]ll persons born or 
naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
 
24, at 1068–71 (describing Bellei as holding that “the statutory citizenship of persons born 
abroad to U.S. citizen parents is not fundamentally irrevocable and may be conditioned by 
Congress”). 
 135 Bellei, 401 U.S. at 835; Perez, supra note 24, at 1071; see also Christina Duffy 
Burnett, “They Say I Am Not an American . . .”: The Noncitizen National and the Law of 
American Empire, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 659, 714 (2008) (concluding the constitutional 
durability of Puerto Rican citizenship remains questionable). 
 136 Puerto Ricans and other citizens from the territories are guaranteed citizenship by 
statute, similarly to the plaintiff in Bellei. See 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (2012) (covering Puerto Rico); 
8 U.S.C. § 1406 (2012) (covering United States Virgin Islands); 8 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012) 
(covering Guam); 48 U.S.C. § 1801(301) (2012) (covering the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Marshall Islands); 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (2012) (covering American Samoa). 
 137 Perez, supra note 24, at 1029–35. But see Blocher & Gulati, supra note 131, at 129–
30 (arguing equal protection or some other collateral right should prevent wanton 
revocation). It is also impossible to seek judicial protection of one’s statutory citizenship. 
Perez discusses the case of Efron ex rel. Efron v. United States, where the Florida District 
Court dismissed the plaintiff, a Puerto Rican, who sued to have her statutory citizenship 
recognized as constitutional. Perez, supra note 24, at 1031–32; Efron ex rel. Efron v. United 
States, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1468, 1469 (S.D. Fla. 1998). 
 138 See generally Rose Cuison Villazor, American Nationals and Interstitial Citizenship, 
85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1673 (2017); Sean Morrison, Foreign in a Domestic Sense: American 
Samoa and the Last U.S. Nationals, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71 (2013); Benjamin E. 
Mannion, Note, “A People Distinct from Others”: Service, Sacrifice, and Extending 
Naturalized Citizenship to American Samoans, 27 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 477 
(2018); Benjamin Wallace Mendelson, Note, Courts Have Gone Off the Map: The 
Geographic Scope of the Citizenship Clause, 95 TEX. L. REV. 873 (2017); Ivy Yeung, 
Note, The Price of Citizenship: Would Citizenship Cost American Samoa Its National 
Identity?, 17 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2016); Benjamin S. Morrell, Note, Some More for 
Samoa: The Case for Citizenship Uniformity, 9 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 475 (2014); Perez, supra 
note 24, at 1029. 
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citizens of the United States.”139 These discussions generally propose methods 
for maneuvering around Tuaua and advocate the Insular Cases’ abrogation.140 
The implications of Fitisemanu’s assertion that Fourteenth Amendment 
citizenship can apply to the unincorporated territories within the Insular Cases 
framework are largely unconsidered, particularly the consequences if any 
territory ultimately determines it desires independence.141 
Should the argument that American Samoans are entitled to constitutional 
citizenship as a result of jus soli prevail, it will breathe life into a right to remain 
under United States sovereignty, permanently binding the current 
unincorporated territories to the Union.142 Some may argue this is not a problem, 
but it would prevent the possibility of Puerto Rico, or any other territory from 
being granted—or made—independent from the United States, which would 
remove that option as a possible solution to the problem of the democratic deficit 
in the American territories.143 Further, any local cultural practices in a territory 
unable to withstand constitutional scrutiny would likely not be able to be 
protected.144 
Two scenarios are possible, but with profound differences in effect. The 
first, the Part V.A scenario, would overturn the Insular Cases and abrogate 
territorial incorporation to extend Fourteenth Amendment citizenship to 
American Samoa because the court finds that necessary in order to find the 
territory “in the United States” for the purpose of the Citizenship Clause.145 This 
is less likely, as it would be a dramatic change in law, but is not impossible 
given the previous discussion of the possibility that “ties between the United 
States and any of its unincorporated territories [may] strengthen in ways that are 
of constitutional significance;”146 a century of inaction could be significant. The 
second, the Part V.B scenario, would find no conflict between the Insular Cases 
 
 139 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 140 See, e.g., Fitisemanu Summary Judgment Motion, supra note 15, at 32; 
Morrison, supra note 138, at 145–50; Neil Weare, Citizenship in U.S. Territories: 
Constitutional Rights or Congressional Privilege?, 29 CENTRO J. 136, 139 (2017); 
Mannion, supra note 138, at 512; Mendelson, supra note 138, at 885–88; Morrell, supra note 
138, at 484–87. 
 141 Perez, supra note 24, at 1053–57 (arguing a jus soli argument for Fourteenth 
Amendment citizenship in Puerto Rico bearing substantial similarity to the argument made 
by the Fitisemanu plaintiffs); see also Blocher & Gulati, supra note 131, at 127 (“There is 
no conceptual need for citizenship and territorial status to rise or fall together. It is easy 
enough to imagine American citizens living on non-state or even non-American soil. That’s 
what expatriates do. Nor is it inconceivable to imagine the creation of a new state whose 
residents would not immediately and automatically become citizens.”). 
 142 Arguably such a right would, then, have always existed, minimally since the passage 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, it remains untested, as Congress has never ceded 
an incorporated territory before.  
 143 See infra Part V.A. 
 144 See infra text accompanying note 154. 
 145 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 146 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 758 (2008). 
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and Fourteenth Amendment birthright citizenship while still preserving the legal 
fiction separating the unincorporated territories from the Union. Such a scenario 
seems most plausible if the court is inclined to grant Fitisemanu relief. Retaining 
the Insular Cases while extending birthright citizenship maneuvers facially 
around precedent, despite functionally making a major change. 
A. Resolving Fitisemanu to Abrogate the Insular Cases and Extend 
Fourteenth Amendment Birthright Citizenship 
Should the Supreme Court eventually extend birthright citizenship and 
determine it necessary to abrogate the Insular Cases and territorial incorporation 
to find American Samoa is “in the United States” for purposes of the Citizenship 
Clause, it is unclear what would then transpire. At present, the Insular Cases 
require U.S. territories be explicitly incorporated by Congress to be considered 
in the United States and are otherwise separate from the Union of states and 
incorporated territories.147 Relatedly, Texas v. White determined that the Union 
is perpetual and indestructible.148 That said, the doctrine has recently shifted 
slightly in order to accommodate local cultures, the extent to which is not yet 
known.149 It is possible such a ruling could be specifically tailored to American 
Samoa for some reason, despite the straightforward logic that without the 
exception to the Uniformity Clause created by the Insular Cases, birthright 
citizenship would apply uniformly.150  
Abrogating the Insular Cases would immediately incorporate every 
territory.151 Once incorporated, they would likely be part of the perpetual, 
indestructible Union.152 Every territory would be fully incorporated and 
populated by American citizens sure of that status but trapped in their current 
status limbo, without the option to pursue temporary or permanent 
independence.153 Additionally, local customs and race-restrictive laws generally 
 
 147 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 148 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 149 See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 150 See Constitutional Law Amici Curiae Memorandum, supra note 19, at 14. Arguably, 
American Samoa is itself a poor candidate for judicially imposed citizenship, given the 
concerns of some that a greater application of the Constitution might threaten local customs. 
See, e.g., Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 309–10 (2015) (discussing the “probable 
danger citizenship poses to American Samoa’s customs and cultural mores”). If this case 
were focused on another territory, there would at least be a weak policy argument against 
the uniform application of birthright citizenship. 
 151 See supra Part III.B. 
 152 See id. 
 153 See generally Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., U.S. Territories and Affiliated Jurisdictions: 
Colonialism or Reasonable Choice for Small Societies?, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 429 (2011) 
[hereinafter Laughlin, Colonialism or Reasonable] (discussing the positive and negative 
aspects of independence, arguing the choice to remain affiliated with the United States 
should not be disregarded and warning the courts to be careful when applying rights in 
territories to respect local customs). 
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thought to preserve local cultures would likely be in legal jeopardy,154 which 
could see the attempted remedy of an old injustice inflict new ones. Under this 
scenario, Puerto Rico could still accede to statehood someday. With 
independence unavailable, the Puerto Rican people might unite in demanding 
statehood and finally force Congress’s hand. Other, much smaller,155 territories 
would have to remain in their current statuses, be annexed by an existing state, 
or require a constitutional amendment providing real representation in the 
federal government.156 
B. Resolving Fitisemanu to Preserve the Insular Cases and Extend 
Fourteenth Amendment Birthright Citizenship 
A Supreme Court decision extending Fourteenth Amendment citizenship to 
American Samoa consistent with the Insular Cases is more likely than 
overturning territorial incorporation if the Court is inclined to change the law.157 
The Court could extend Fourteenth Amendment citizenship under the recent 
reinterpretation of the Insular Cases, which accounts for particular 
circumstances and protection of local customs.158 The Court could also follow 
the argument of the Fitisemanu amici scholars, that the Insular Cases should be 
read narrowly to permit the extension of birthright citizenship based on a 
distinction between being “throughout the United States” under the Uniformity 
Clause and “in the United States” under the Fourteenth Amendment.159 The 
Court could find constitutional significance in Congress’s failure to address the 
status of the territories for nearly a century and conclude that it has finally 
metastasized into a de facto desire to retain them with enough permanence that 
their people should, at birth, be considered citizens. The degree to which the 
Court relied on a jus soli line of reasoning could alter the shape of the decision 
 
 154 See Laughlin, Cultural Preservation, supra note 8, at 331, 341. But see Marybeth 
Herald, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag into United States Territories or Can It Be 
Separately Purchased and Sold?, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 707, 739, 768–69 (1995) 
(challenging idea that racial restrictions on land alienation should be protected, arguing they 
are unconstitutional). 
 155 See infra text accompanying note 185 (comparing the populations of Wyoming, 
Washington, D.C., and each territory). 
 156 The territories all currently have non-voting delegates in the House. See Legislative 
Interests in the Territories, U.S.H.R. HIST. ART & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/ 
Exhibitions-and-Publications/HAIC/Historical-Essays/Strength-Numbers/Legislative 
-Territories/ [https://perma.cc/792E-5NTX] (discussing the role of territorial delegates). 
Such a proposal would also be uncomfortable regarding American principles of equal 
representation, because if the territories could not be states, then what essentially lesser 
representation should they be entitled to—one voting representative but no Senator? See 
Laughlin, Colonialism or Reasonable, supra note 153, at 431–36. It becomes an ugly 
discussion that could ultimately answer one wrong with another.  
 157 See supra Part V.A. 
 158 See supra text accompanying notes 8, 54. 
 159 Constitutional Law Amici Curiae Memorandum, supra note 19, at 10–15. 
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as well.160 Similarly, as above, such a ruling would ultimately affect all the 
territories uniformly.161 
The result of this decision would be more interesting. Retaining the Insular 
Cases would likely mean the Citizenship Clause, even if applying of its own 
force, would remain subject to the “impracticable and anomalous”162 test and 
guarantees of “fundamental personal rights” in the territories.163 Afroyim stated 
that “[o]nce acquired, this Fourteenth Amendment citizenship was not to be 
shifted, canceled, or diluted at the will of the Federal Government, the States, 
or any other governmental unit.”164 Without the impractical and anomalous test, 
the Afroyim right to constitutional citizenship could very well prevent Congress 
from granting independence. However, the concern for the “particular 
circumstances” and “possible alternatives which Congress ha[s] before it” under 
such a circumstance could render it “impracticable and anomalous” to prevent 
Congress from minorly diluting citizenship rights to affirm a popular consensus 
in favor of independence.165 One scholar asserted a right to self-determination 
existed in the Constitution.166 Under a standard that treats territories specifically 
and guarantees fundamental rights, it seems possible that a locally advanced and 
democratically determined movement for self-determination could 
constitutionally permit a qualified form of independence.167 
C. Resolving Fitisemanu Properly 
The Insular Cases may be the exemplar for stare decisis—they are wrongly 
decided but should be retained. The Fitisemanu Court should rule that the 
Insular Cases and territorial incorporation control. The effort to distinguish the 
Fourteenth Amendment from the Incorporation Doctrine is interesting, but the 
judicial extension of citizenship seems difficult to justify without massively 
undermining territorial incorporation. The doctrine and the Insular Cases sit 
upon more than a century of precedent, and their essential holdings were 
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court as recently as 2008 in Boumediene and by the 
 
 160 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 161 But see supra text accompanying note 137. Efron suggests a claim might only ever 
be able to be made if Congress attempted to revoke a territorial population’s citizenship 
status, or if Congress attempted to grant independence to a territory. 
 162 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759 (2008) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 
74–75 (1957)). 
 163 Id. at 758 (quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922)). 
 164 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 262 (1967) (emphasis added).  
 165 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759. Arguably, this could also serve to protect local customs 
and laws perpetuating indigenous ownership of land in American Samoa and the Northern 
Mariana Islands; the crucial factors would be the validity of the impractical and anomalous 
standard and that it be applied consistently with previous cases. Laughlin, Cultural 
Preservation, supra note 8, at 352–53. 
 166 Javier J. Rúa Jovet, The Fourth Option: Modern Self-Determination of Peoples and 
the Possibilities of U.S. Federalism, 49 REV. DER. P.R. 163, 209–13 (2010). 
 167 See infra Part VI.B. 
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D.C. Circuit in 2015 in Tuaua.168 The American system of territorial law and 
government, with its serious constitutional and normative democratic flaws, is 
reliant on the Insular Cases’ determinations.169 To disturb them would throw 
the lives of millions into uncertainty.170 
Further, there is a real possibility that greater constitutional integration 
would threaten laws protecting indigenous land and ownership and ancient 
customs, which, given the wrong such litigation seeks to right, is particularly 
concerning.171 The reasoning behind the Insular Cases, both past and present, 
is heavily infected with policy considerations but, ironically, striking them down 
would make a profound policy choice against independence for any territory. 
The cases are flawed and have caused their share of harm,172 but the real blame 
should lie with Congress, which has contributed more to this democratic deficit 
and all the evils it entails than any other decision or institution. The collective 
failure of the legislature to act on behalf of the people of the territories is likely 
to transcend and eclipse any “victory” in court. 
VI. NO EASY ANSWERS 
At present, any resolution to the territories’ status and representative 
challenges discussed above is possible. If independence is preferred, the process 
could proceed in numerous forms and should involve close communication with 
and deference to the citizens of the specific territory. However, it is entirely 
possible that the territories would reject independence. In American Samoa 
there is a strong desire to remain with the United States:173 majorities favored 
 
 168 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 726; Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 306–07 (2015). 
But see Aurelius Inv. v. Puerto Rico, 915 F.3d 838, 854–55 (1st Cir. 2019) (describing the 
lineage of the Insular Cases as “discredited” and concluding they do not control in an 
analysis of the Appointments Clause). 
 169 See supra note 48. 
 170 See infra text accompanying note 185 (estimating the population sizes of U.S. 
territories). 
 171 See Laughlin, Cultural Preservation, supra note 8, at 375 (describing the importance 
of preserving cultural choices for locals and asking if it can be conceivably “in anyone’s 
interest for mainland judges to tell the U.S. islands that they must abandon those cultures?”); 
Rose Cuison Villazor, Blood Quantum Land Laws and the Race Versus Political Identity 
Dilemma, 96 CAL. L. REV. 801, 801–02 (2008) (questioning whether certain laws based on 
indigenous ancestry would withstand full constitutional scrutiny); Weaver, supra note 8, at 
367 (discussing how the United States’ administration of American Samoa has generally 
guarded Samoan traditional customs, the “fa’a Samoa,” but is beginning to harm the rights 
of some residents).  
 172 See supra text accompanying note 51. 
 173 See FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS STUDY COMM. OF AM. SAM., supra note 8, at 42–43 
(finding “[t]he Samoan public, from leaders to the rank and file, both on and off-island, 
overwhelming [sic] emphasized two major points: (a) American Samoa must remain part of 
the American family of states and territories; (b) be certain that a chosen status will not 
adversely affect customs and culture, and the perpetuation of the Samoan language,” and 
recommending American Samoa continue in its current status, but initiate negotiations with 
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statehood in recent Puerto Rican non-binding referenda,174 no major party in the 
U.S. Virgin Islands advocates independence,175 and Guam has an active 
movement challenging its current status.176 The Court’s decision in Fitisemanu 
 
Congress for a permanent status); U.N., Caribbean Reg’l Seminar on Third Int’l Decade for 
the Eradication of Colonialism, Statement Submitted by Mr. Daniel Aga of Am. Sam., U.N. 
Doc. CRS/2017/CRP.5/Rev.1 (2017), https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/sites/  
www.un.org.dppa.decolonization/files/2017_5_nsgt_american_samoa.pdf  [https:// 
perma.cc/T2KY-2P6E] (“Given our present government and way of life, do we, in 
American Samoa, live under a regime for which colonization must be eradicated? Do we 
consider ourselves a colonized people? The answer to both questions is No. We do not. Is 
there is a widespread yearning for political independence? No. There is not.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (original emphasis omitted)). 
 174 R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PUERTO RICO’S POLITICAL STATUS AND 
THE 2012 PLEBISCITE: BACKGROUND AND KEY QUESTIONS 1, 8 (June 2013), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42765.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ERB-VDNB] (observing in 
a 2012 status referendum that “when asked if Puerto Rico should retain its current status, 
53.97% answered no; 46.03% answered yes,” and “when asked to select among the three 
listed status options, 61.16% chose statehood; 33.34% chose sovereign free associated state, 
and 5.49% chose independence”) (internal quotations omitted). The most recent referendum 
in 2017 suffered numerous problems, casting doubt on the value of its results. See Frances 
Robles, 23% of Puerto Ricans Vote in Referendum, 97% of Them for Statehood, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/11/us/puerto-ricans-vote-on-the-
question-of-statehood.html [https://perma.cc/WU2G-PY8Z] (discussing the status 
debate, low turnout, and how the pro-statehood government advanced the referendum while 
the Department of Justice requested a delay and the opposition party called for a boycott).  
 175 See Enrice Gilbert, U.S.V.I. Could Remain with U.S. or Seek Independence; U.S. 
Gov’t Says, V.I. CONSORTIUM (Apr. 3, 2016), https://viconsortium.com/breaking-news/u-
s-v-i-could-remain-with-u-s-or-seek-independence-u-s-govt-says/ [https://perma.cc/ 
7HF2-RNKL] (covering St. Croix speech by the Obama-era Secretary of the Interior, where 
a promise that U.S.V.I. could choose independence was “received with silence,” about which 
U.S.V.I. Senate President later said, “I just want to be an American”); April Knight, 
‘Homegrown’ Independent Citizens Movement Celebrates 50 Years, ST. JOHN SOURCE (Oct. 
22, 2018), https://stjohnsource.com/2018/10/22/homegrown-independent-citizens-
movement-celebrates-50-years/ [https://perma.cc/L6AM-UJYS] (noting that while 
Democrats “dominate” the political landscape and the Republicans are insignificant, the 
Independent Citizens Movement, a longstanding third-party, advocates “self-determination” 
and modification of U.S.V.I.’s current status without full separation from the United States, 
although with greater leeway to maintain personal and commercial relationships with nearby 
Caribbean countries; however, the party considers education their top priority); Senator 
Neville James, 33RD LEGISLATURE V.I., http://www.legvi.org/senators/st-croix/senator-
neville-james/ [https://perma.cc/TJB7-9PXH] (showing that the U.S.V.I. Senate 
President represents the Democratic party).  
 176 Davis v. Guam, 932 F.3d 822, 824–33 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding the nonbinding Guam 
future status plebiscite’s restriction of voting to “Native Inhabitants of Guam” constitutes a 
proxy for race, making it an impermissible racial restriction on 15th Amendment voting 
rights); Steve Limtiaco, Court: Political Status Vote Is Illegally Race-Based, PAC. DAILY 
NEWS (July 30, 2019), https://www.guampdn.com/story/news/2019/07/29/federal -
court-political-status-vote-illegally-race-based/1863474001/ [https://perma.cc/DTN6 
-TGKU] (discussing the ongoing status debate, and the intentions of the government and 
activists to continue seeking a change to Guam’s current political status); Clynt Ridgell, 
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could have a decisive impact on this debate by limiting Congress’s ability to 
advance territorial self-government by narrowing the options of what can be 
done, absent a constitutional amendment. 
A ruling that overturns the Insular Cases to extend Fourteenth Amendment 
birthright citizenship to American Samoa should extend that guarantee to all 
territorial citizens and bind the territories to the United States permanently.177 
A similar ruling that does not overturn the Insular Cases would prevent 
unqualified independence but would preserve the possibility of free 
association.178 An ideal resolution of the territorial question would balance a 
plan’s constitutional legality, the desires of the people of the territory in 
question, and American commitments to self-government under both normative 
values and international treaties. Each of these factors is in tension and may not 
all be possible to satisfy. Present circumstances, however, offend them all. 
Criticism of the Insular Cases is legally compelling, but a potential policy 
disaster. The legal status quo gives Congress discretion to craft solutions 
carefully tailored for each territory.179 This should not be disregarded. 
At present, Congress has substantial power to address the problems with the 
status of the territories,180 including to grant full independence to any territory, 
qualified independence with a treaty of free association, as well as a more 
traditional route of incorporation and eventual statehood.181 If the Insular Cases 
are abrogated, then the territories would be automatically incorporated, and only 
statehood, incorporation into a state, or a continuation of the status quo remain 
as options. If the Insular Cases remain untouched, but Fourteenth Amendment 
 
What Is Decolonization, Self-Determination, and a Plebscite? [sic], PAC. NEWS CTR. (May 
2, 2018), https://pncguam.com/what-is-decolonization-self-determination-and-a-plebscite/ 
[https://perma.cc/3XJE-V3NL] (discussing the background of the status debate, how 
gubernatorial candidates are opining on the issue, and the three considered statuses of free 
association, independence, and statehood).  
 177 See supra Part V.A. 
 178 See supra Part V.B. 
 179 See supra Part III.A; see also Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1876 
(2016) (suggesting Congress possesses substantial leeway in legislating to give greater 
autonomy to the territories, specifically Puerto Rico). 
 180 See Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1876. 
 181 See Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Puerto Rico and the Right of Accession, 43 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 229, 269 (2018) (arguing from a mixed U.S. constitutional and international law 
perspective that the U.S. Territories have a right to choose to remain under American 
sovereignty or gain independence); Jovet, supra note 166, at 164–65, 215–17 (offering no 
specific solution, but arguing “[t]he fact is that, not only internationally, but also federally, 
most ends are possible, when there is sufficient political will,” and finding that a closer 
relationship than free association is possible); Laughlin, Colonialism or Reasonable, supra 
note 153, at 440–41 (suggesting Congress will have to propose a constitutional amendment 
to “create a more fundamentally sound charter for territorial self-government”); 
Peralta, supra note 27, at 256 (asserting a future for the territories “cannot include [a] 
territorial regime,” the source of their problems); Perez, supra note 24, at 1080–81 
(concluding it is “doubtful” the Court can “properly correct the scope of the Citizenship 
Clause” without overruling the Insular Cases). 
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birthright citizenship is found to extend to the territories, then a treaty of free 
association remains possible, but unqualified independence would become 
impossible. There has not yet been a serious attempt to address the unique 
scenario where the Insular Cases survive, maintaining the territories’ legal 
separation from the United States, despite the extension of Fourteenth 
Amendment birthright citizenship, which is considered below.  
A. Intimate Association is the Best Alternative to the Status Quo 
A ruling that maintains the Insular Cases, but extends Fourteenth 
Amendment birthright citizenship would make unqualified independence for 
any territory legally impossible.182 This would remove complete independence 
as a choice for any territory and necessitate finding some method for 
representation and self-government within the American system.183 Puerto 
Rico, given its population, is an obvious candidate for statehood,184 but the same 
might not be true for the other territories.185 The other territories’ much smaller 
populations make them problematic candidates, ironically because of potential 
 
 182 See supra Parts V.A, V.B. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Especially because its accession to statehood is publicly supported by both the 
Democratic and Republican parties. See DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM COMM., 2016 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM 21 (2016), https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/10/2016_DNC_Platform.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY4C-8YR4] (appearing to 
additionally contemplate the possibility of independence); COMM. ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR 
THE 2016 REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016 30 (2016), 
https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468 
872234.pdf [https://perma.cc/V67P-ZBQK]. 
 185 Compare Puerto Rico, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (2019), https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rq.html [https://perma.cc/9NBS-6CZD] 
(estimating a population of 3,294,626 people as of July 2018), with District of Columbia 
Population 2019, WORLD POPULATION REV. http://worldpopulationreview.com/ 
states/district-of-columbia-population/ [https://perma.cc/Q6PM-HADK] (estimating a 
population of 702,455 in 2018), and Wyoming Population 2019, WORLD POPULATION REV., 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/wyoming-population/ [https://perma.cc/2R 
U8-3X4G] (estimating a population of 577,737 in 2018). See also American Samoa, CIA 
WORLD FACTBOOK (2019), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fact 
book/geos/aq.html [https://perma.cc/6AQX-5LRT] (estimating a population of 50,826 in 
2018); Guam, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (2019), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ 
the-world-factbook/geos/gq.html [https://perma.cc/9GG9-XZ95] (estimating a 
population of 167,772 in 2018); Northern Mariana Islands, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (2019), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cq.html [https:// 
perma.cc/HC62-MH8N] (estimating a population of 51,994 in 2018); Virgin Islands, CIA 
WORLD FACTBOOK (2019), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/vq.html [https://perma.cc/JKN2-9M8L] (estimating a population of 
106,977). It is further interesting to note the CIA World Factbook maintains separate 
statistics for the territories separate from the United States as a whole. 
1258 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:6 
overrepresentation.186 If a ruling such as that described above in Part V.B 
occurs, a relationship modeled on free association,187 but much more intimate, 
offers an excellent compromise solution.  
Under the Part V.B scenario, a form of free association, where the United 
States guarantees existing rights and privileges by treaty, would permit a 
territory to gain independence. The guarantees must be constructed to not dilute, 
shift, or cancel citizenship rights to avoid offending Afroyim.188 Texas v. White 
suggests that constitutional, full citizenship within the Union would prevent any 
territory from gaining independence.189 However, if territorial incorporation 
survives and the Citizenship Clause is applicable in unincorporated territories, 
that application should operate subject to practical circumstances and cannot 
cause impracticable or anomalous effects.190 An interpretation of the 
Citizenship Clause funneled through territorial incorporation should find a grant 
of independence with a treaty of intimate free association—an agreement of 
“intimate association”—valid, even under a newly heightened standard for 
congressional governance of the territories. 
The great advantage of intimate association is that it could, properly drafted, 
preserve the status quo, allay concerns about threats to local culture and 
traditions, and also be recognized by the U.N. as a valid form of self-
government.191 Given the minimal requirements for a compact of free 
association,192 the United States and each territory could craft a treaty meeting 
their specific needs and new constitutional requirements. 
Crucially, the treaty must pass the Afroyim citizenship test that Fourteenth 
Amendment citizenship, once acquired, cannot be “shifted, canceled, or 
diluted.”193 Such a high standard requires any treaty to incorporate the 
individual rights protected by the U.S. Constitution into the territory-cum-
 
 186 See Eric W. Orts, The Path to Give California 12 Senators and Vermont Just One, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/01/heres-
how-fix-senate/579172/ [https://perma.cc/FCV2-WCC8] (advocating proportional reform 
to the Senate because over-allocation to small-population states is “untenable” on numerical 
and racial grounds). It is also interesting to note he considers the status of Puerto Rico and 
Washington, D.C., but no other territories. Id. 
 187 See Wentworth, supra note 36, at 28–33. Wentworth explains how a state in free 
association is a country whose constitution is determined without external interference; is 
freely entered into through a democratic process; and whose status can be unilaterally altered 
by the freely associated state, beyond which the treaty relationship can include any degree 
of economic aid, agreements to cede responsibility for defense, or even to cede diplomatic 
affairs. Id.  
 188 See supra Part IV.B. 
 189 See supra Part III.B. 
 190 See supra Part III.A.2. 
 191 G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), at 29 (Dec. 15, 1960) (recognizing free association as a valid 
form of self-government); see also supra text accompanying note 154 (discussing racial 
restrictions on land alienation in American Samoa, which meant to preserve indigenous land 
ownership and are of questionable constitutionality). 
 192 G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), at 29 (Dec. 15, 1960). 
 193 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 262 (1967). 
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country’s constitution to prevent rights from being canceled. As the individual 
territories will surely maintain governments offering comparable constitutional 
protections, there should not be any rights problem resulting from the 
separation.194 Similarly, access to government programs and support would 
likely need to remain the same as under American sovereignty to prevent 
citizenship from being diluted. If exact preservation is unworkable, Congress 
could create special versions to accommodate citizens of the new freely 
associated states or provide financial support for locally run alternatives similar 
to current agreements with Micronesia and the Marshall Islands.195 Congress 
should also guarantee visa-free travel rights and the unconstrained movement of 
money and goods; security could be retained under this scheme if the United 
States continued to operate customs and border security services in the 
territories-cum-countries.196 
Afroyim’s statement that citizenship cannot be shifted197 is the most difficult 
standard. It faces a straightforward argument that free association, even if 
intimate, still shifts the duties of the U.S. government onto the newly 
independent government.198 For this argument, the Insular Cases’ recent 
reinterpretation may be crucial.199 Without accommodation for differences in 
the territories, the Afroyim right to constitutional citizenship200 could very well 
prevent Congress from granting independence. If a decision similar to the one 
discussed above in Part V.B occurs, the concern for the “particular 
circumstances” and “possible alternatives which Congress ha[s] before it” could 
arguably render it “impracticable and anomalous”201 to prevent Congress from 
minorly diluting citizenship rights in favor of increased self-government and 
protection of local culture.  
Language preserving a territory’s right to accession could strengthen the 
constitutionality of these treaties by underscoring the right of U.S. citizens living 
in independent territories to full membership in the Union. Concurrently, 
Congress should pass preemptive-enabling legislation that creates standing-
offer terms for the territories-cum-freely-associated-states to be fully 
 
 194 See supra note 42. 
 195 Compacts of Free Association, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, OFF. INSULAR AFF., 
https://www.doi.gov/oia/compacts-of-free-association [https://perma.cc/WA5V-4BRV]. 
 196 See Wentworth, supra note 36, at 29–32 (discussing how the U.N. approved of New 
Zealand’s free association agreement with the Cook Islands where New Zealand continued 
to maintain responsibility for external affairs and defense; Switzerland’s agreement to 
conduct diplomatic relations for Liechtenstein; New Zealand’s treaty to act as “a channel of 
communications” for The Independent State of Samoa’s foreign affairs; and Bhutan’s 
agreement to “be guided by” India in foreign affairs via a treaty). 
 197 Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 262. 
 198 See supra note 42. 
 199 See supra Part III.A.2. 
 200 Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 262. 
 201 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759 (2008) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 
74–75 (1957)). 
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incorporated into the Union if their governments determine that statehood or 
incorporation into a state is the best course for their people. 
Above are the more important matters a constitutionally valid compact of 
intimate association would need to address under the Part V.B scenario. Such a 
treaty will necessarily be determined after lengthy negotiations and should be 
passed by the Senate.202 The legal objective of such treaties would be to ensure 
the full rights and social guarantees American citizens possessed while living in 
the U.S. Territories would continue to apply unaltered after independence. The 
combined social and political objective is to create a space for the people of the 
territories to determine their own futures and their preferred relationship with 
the United States without congressional or judicial meddling. The major 
drawbacks would be the cost, both in political and actual capital. These 
guarantees would be expensive, and elected officials may be unwilling to fund 
programs for Americans living outside the country proper.203 Relatedly, the 
President can unilaterally terminate any treaty without notice, which could 
endanger the treaties in the event of a dispute.204 
An intimate compact of free association would provide the positive 
elements of the status quo while minimizing, if not rectifying, the democratic 
deficit in the territories.205 Free association would also protect American 
Samoan culture and customs from unwanted encroachment by American 
constitutional law while preserving a close relationship with the United 
States.206 Because free association is recognized as a form of self-government 
by the U.N.,207 it would allow the territories to be removed from the list of non-
self-governing territories that is a national embarrassment.208 While the 
compacts of intimate association are discussed in the wake of a Supreme Court 
decision upending territorial law, they could be created prior to such a decision. 
Implementation before the law changes would occur with minimal legalistic 
restraint and would preserve the most options. 
 
 202 U.S. CONST. art. II § 2, cl. 2. 
 203 See generally Jessica Trisko Darden, Federal Disaster Aid for Puerto Rico Isn’t 




 204 See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1005–06 n.1 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring). 
 205 See supra Part V.A. 
 206 See supra note 191. 
 207 G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), at 29 (Dec. 15, 1960). 
 208 See Peralta, supra note 27, at 256 (discussing how territorial status violates 
international law and arguing that some other status, such as free association, is needed). 
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B. Seemingly Intuitive Alternative Solutions Are Wanting 
As always, the possibility exists to amend the Constitution;209 Congress is 
also capable of integrating the territories into existing states, likely requiring 
their consent.210 Either of these options is valid under present law and would 
remain valid under any scenario the judiciary may invent.211 The difficulty of 
passing a constitutional amendment would likely be challenging to the point of 
infeasibility.212 Assuming an amendment could pass, it would restore a flawed 
status quo or entrench a system of unequal representation.213 Unfortunately, a 
similar risk exists if Congress chooses to incorporate territories into states. 
These solutions, while they may appear attractive, risk being seriously flawed 
and are not necessary, making such extreme steps improper solutions. 
1. Constitutional Amendment 
Passing a constitutional amendment risks certain problems, most seriously 
that an amendment to provide representation for the territories in Congress could 
enshrine unequal representation in the Constitution. While the idea of securing 
some representation in Congress is desirable, if achieved at a status less than 
statehood, it still would be unequal. An amendment worth passing should not 
be treated as a resolution to the issue of territories in the American system of 
government, but rather as a tool to manage their transition to a desirable final 
status.  
An amendment should account for the reality that the territories are 
practically a part of the United States and provide some voting representation 
for the territories in Congress, perhaps making their representatives in the House 
full members. The amendment should provide a mechanism requiring popular 
approval in the territory for any status changes Congress may enact. A related 
mechanism may be required for relinquishing constitutional citizenship rights, 
should a territory choose independence. The amendment could explicitly 
preserve the protections for local culture and customs recently read into 
territorial incorporation, which would be particularly beneficial to American 
Samoa.214 Perhaps the amendment could create a constitutionally valid 
commonwealth status that would prevent Congress from meddling in territorial 
governments, similar to the sovereignty of states. 
 
 209 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 210 Id. at art. IV § 3. 
 211 See discussion supra Part V. 
 212 See Lawson, supra note 52, at 910; Drew Desilver, Proposed Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution Seldom Go Anywhere, PEW RES. CTR., https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/04/12/a-look-at-proposed-constitutional-amendments-and-how-seldom-
they-go-anywhere/ [https://perma.cc/UN2Z-CDF3]. 
 213 See supra note 27. 
 214 See supra text accompanying notes 8, 52. 
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First, passing a constitutional amendment combined with the difficulty of 
the necessary debate makes the process an unrealistic solution from the start. 
Second, this amendment is no panacea and requires potentially uncomfortable 
trade-offs between substantive representation and equal representation. The 
territories cannot and should not be treated as states unless Congress is willing 
to admit them as states. A single representative in Congress would likely convey 
the second-class status the plaintiffs in Fitisemanu decry.215 However, it would 
be an improvement upon the current non-voting delegate status. Further, if the 
Supreme Court is truly signaling an intention to alter the Incorporation Doctrine 
in the future,216 the precise wording of this amendment will likely become the 
focus of a major interpretative debate and could produce uncertain 
consequences, however it may be worded and whatever it contains.217 For those 
reasons, a constitutional amendment is not a preferable solution. 
2. Combination with Existing States 
The territories could be incorporated into states with their consent. This 
solution seems attractive but suffers from similar problems as a constitutional 
amendment. First, it assumes the consent of a state,218 which may not be given. 
Second, it assumes the consent of the territorial populations, which is not a 
given.219 Third, this solution would not protect indigenous cultures and customs 
from constitutional scrutiny whatsoever.220 Fourth, and perhaps most seriously, 
this solution assumes essentially becoming a county within a state would solve 
the problem of representation. It is easy to imagine the few state legislators 
representing an erstwhile territory being overwhelmed by their new peers from 
the original state. Similarly, the small populations might merely be folded into 
existing congressional districts, rather than gaining any of their own.221 This 
 
 215 See Fitisemanu Complaint, supra note 9, at 18–24. 
 216 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 758 (2008) (“It may well be that over time 
the ties between the United States and any of its unincorporated Territories strengthen in 
ways that are of constitutional significance.”). 
 217 Id. 
 218 Geographically, the best candidate to absorb American Samoa, Guam, and the 
Northern Mariana Islands would be Hawaii. The U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico could 
conceivably be incorporated into Florida, but the larger population of Puerto Rico makes it 
a better candidate for statehood itself. 
 219 If the state in question consented, Congress has the power to force territories to accept 
this, but that would be attempting to right one wrong with another. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 3. 
 220 See supra note 154. 
 221 Hawaii currently has two representatives, each with a district containing 
approximately 710,000 people. Hawaii, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/  
members/HI#representatives [https://perma.cc/2S8K-QRDJ]. American Samoa, Guam, 
and the Northern Mariana Islands have a combined population of approximately 270,000 
people. See supra text accompanying note 185. It is likely the interests of each specific 
territory’s population would be substantially diluted.  
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purported solution risks displacing the distant and unmotivated government in 
Washington with another in Honolulu or San Juan. Combination with another 
state could be a proper final status for certain territories, and should not be 
removed as an option, but it cannot be the only option. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Constitution offers inadequate guidance for the future of the territories, 
and territorial jurisprudence is based upon a century-old unconstitutional policy 
decision made by the Supreme Court. The Court, in its last case addressing 
territorial incorporation, signaled that “over time the ties between the United 
States and any of its unincorporated Territories [may] strengthen in ways that 
are of constitutional significance.”222 The Fitisemanu plaintiffs point to this 
with hope,223 but it could as easily be observed with dread. A rapid change to 
such a vast precedent underpinning so many laws and policies would cause 
tremendous uncertainty and further prevent Congress from taking responsibility 
for the unincorporated territories. Congress, whatever it chooses to do, must act 
and seek a solution preserving what is beneficial in the present system while 
providing more genuine self-government. The sad truth is that not everyone can 
win: either American patriots or Puerto Rican nationalists will eventually be 
disappointed. Mr. Fitisemanu may gain his citizenship, but the people in his 
homeland may have their government thrown into disarray. Fitisemanu is the 
second court case contesting American Samoan citizenship,224 and more are 
sure to come. This will likely continue until the Supreme Court is forced to 
weigh in. The territories are similarly situated to a fine dinner set, and the 
doctrine of territorial incorporation is the tablecloth beneath it. Congress can 
choose to clear the table at any time, but the longer it waits, the greater the risk 
that the Supreme Court may enter and rip out the tablecloth. The finery may 
remain in place or come crashing to the ground. Congress has abdicated its 
responsibility for too long. It should act before the Court intervenes. 
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